fix: exec guard treats agent CLI slash commands as non-paths

Agent CLI tools (claude, codex, gemini) use slash commands like
"/review" that look like absolute paths. Instead of generic quote
handling, detect these tools specifically and check os.Stat before
blocking — if the path does not exist, it is a slash command.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
dj-oyu 2026-02-22 17:27:28 +09:00
parent ae2b2c0d4e
commit 226819af53
2 changed files with 46 additions and 41 deletions

View file

@ -291,11 +291,17 @@ func (t *ExecTool) guardCommand(command, cwd string) string {
}
// Token-based absolute path detection.
// Uses shellTokenize to respect quoted strings (e.g., "/review ..."
// is a single argument, not a file path).
// Uses strings.Fields so relative paths (e.g., "tests/cold/file.py")
// are not falsely flagged.
// Flags like -I/usr/local/include are naturally skipped because
// filepath.IsAbs returns false for tokens starting with "-".
for _, token := range shellTokenize(cmd) {
//
// Agent CLI tools (claude, codex, gemini) accept slash commands
// (e.g., "/review") that look like absolute paths but are not.
// For these tools we check whether the token is an existing path
// before blocking.
agentCLI := isAgentCLICommand(cmd)
for _, token := range strings.Fields(cmd) {
token = strings.Trim(token, "\"'")
if !filepath.IsAbs(token) {
@ -313,6 +319,13 @@ func (t *ExecTool) guardCommand(command, cwd string) string {
if isExecutable(p) {
continue
}
// Agent CLI slash commands: skip non-existent paths
// (e.g., "/review" is a command, not a file).
if agentCLI {
if _, statErr := os.Stat(p); os.IsNotExist(statErr) {
continue
}
}
return "Command blocked by safety guard (path outside working dir)"
}
}
@ -321,40 +334,23 @@ func (t *ExecTool) guardCommand(command, cwd string) string {
return ""
}
// shellTokenize splits a command string into tokens while respecting
// single and double quotes. Quoted substrings are returned as a single
// token (with the quotes still attached so the caller can trim them).
// This prevents false positives where a quoted argument like
// "/review skip-git-repo-check" would be split into "/review" and
// "skip-git-repo-check" by strings.Fields.
func shellTokenize(s string) []string {
var tokens []string
var cur strings.Builder
var quote byte // 0 = none, '\'' or '"'
for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
ch := s[i]
switch {
case quote != 0:
cur.WriteByte(ch)
if ch == quote {
quote = 0
// agentCLINames lists agent CLI tools that use slash commands
// (e.g., "/review", "/help") which look like absolute paths.
var agentCLINames = []string{"claude", "codex", "gemini"}
// isAgentCLICommand returns true if the command invokes an agent CLI tool.
func isAgentCLICommand(cmd string) bool {
fields := strings.Fields(cmd)
if len(fields) == 0 {
return false
}
case ch == '\'' || ch == '"':
cur.WriteByte(ch)
quote = ch
case ch == ' ' || ch == '\t':
if cur.Len() > 0 {
tokens = append(tokens, cur.String())
cur.Reset()
}
default:
cur.WriteByte(ch)
base := filepath.Base(fields[0])
for _, name := range agentCLINames {
if base == name {
return true
}
}
if cur.Len() > 0 {
tokens = append(tokens, cur.String())
}
return tokens
return false
}
// isExecutable checks if a path points to an executable file.

View file

@ -487,21 +487,30 @@ func TestGuardCommand_CdWithAbsoluteWorkspacePath(t *testing.T) {
}
}
func TestGuardCommand_QuotedSlashArgNotBlocked(t *testing.T) {
func TestGuardCommand_AgentCLISlashCommand(t *testing.T) {
workspace := t.TempDir()
tool := NewExecTool(workspace, true)
// A quoted argument starting with "/" is not a file path — it's a
// command argument that happens to contain a slash.
// Agent CLI slash commands (e.g., "/review") are not file paths.
// They should be allowed because they don't exist on disk.
cmds := []string{
`codex exec --yolo "/review skip-git-repo-check"`,
`echo '/hello world'`,
`grep "/etc/passwd" file.txt`,
`claude "/review"`,
`gemini "/help"`,
}
for _, cmd := range cmds {
result := tool.guardCommand(cmd, workspace)
if result != "" {
t.Errorf("Quoted argument should not be blocked: %q → %s", cmd, result)
t.Errorf("Agent CLI slash command should not be blocked: %q → %s", cmd, result)
}
}
// Non-agent commands with absolute paths should still be blocked.
if runtime.GOOS != "windows" {
blocked := `cat /etc/hosts`
result := tool.guardCommand(blocked, workspace)
if result == "" {
t.Errorf("Non-agent command with absolute path should be blocked: %q", blocked)
}
}
}