feat(security): add environment sanitization for exec tool

- Add env.go with environment filtering logic
- Add EnvSet and EnvAllowlist config options
- Block sensitive variables (PATH, HOME, LD_*, PICOCLAW_*) from LLM override
- Add PICOCLAW_* env vars to child processes
- Document the feature
This commit is contained in:
Keith Patrick 2026-03-09 03:49:50 +00:00
parent 7ea7bb0717
commit 369edf30af
4 changed files with 401 additions and 7 deletions

View file

@ -52,10 +52,38 @@ The exec tool is used to execute shell commands.
| `enable_deny_patterns` | bool | true | Enable default dangerous command blocking |
| `custom_deny_patterns` | array | [] | Custom deny patterns (regular expressions) |
### Functionality
### Environment Sanitization
- **`enable_deny_patterns`**: Set to `false` to completely disable the default dangerous command blocking patterns
- **`custom_deny_patterns`**: Add custom deny regex patterns; commands matching these will be blocked
The exec tool sanitizes the environment passed to child processes:
1. **Default allowlist** — Only these variables are inherited from the parent process:
- `PATH`, `HOME`, `USER`, `LANG`, `SHELL`, `TERM`, `PWD`, `OLDPWD`, `HOSTNAME`, `LOGNAME`, `TZ`, `DISPLAY`, `TMPDIR`, `EDITOR`, `PAGER`
- Plus: `HTTP_PROXY`, `HTTPS_PROXY`, `NO_PROXY`
- Plus locale: `LC_ALL`, `LC_CTYPE`, `LC_MESSAGES`, `LC_MONETARY`, `LC_NUMERIC`, `LC_TIME`, `LC_PAPER`, `LC_NAME`, `LC_ADDRESS`, `LC_TELEPHONE`, `LC_MEASUREMENT`, `LC_IDENTIFICATION`, `LC_COLLATE`
- Plus: `PICOCLAW_HOME`, `PICOCLAW_CONFIG`, `PICOCLAW_AGENT_WORKSPACE`, `PICOCLAW_EXE`, `PICOCLAW_SERVICE_NAME`, `PICOCLAW_EXEC_TIME`, `PICOCLAW_EXEC_TIMEOUT`
2. **Config env_set** — Variables from config are merged (can override inherited values)
3. **Config env_allowlist** — Additional explicit variable names to allow (extends default)
4. **LLM env injection** — The LLM can inject additional variables per-call via the `env` parameter:
```json
{
"name": "exec",
"arguments": {
"command": "echo $DEBUG_MODE",
"env": {
"DEBUG_MODE": "true"
}
}
}
```
**Blocked variables** — The LLM cannot override these sensitive variables:
- `PATH`, `HOME`, `USER`, `LOGNAME`, `SHELL`
- `LD_PRELOAD`, `LD_LIBRARY_PATH`, `LD_AUDIT`, `LD_DEBUG`
- All `PICOCLAW_*` variables
### Default Blocked Command Patterns

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@ -645,6 +645,8 @@ type ExecConfig struct {
CustomDenyPatterns []string ` env:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_EXEC_CUSTOM_DENY_PATTERNS" json:"custom_deny_patterns"`
CustomAllowPatterns []string ` env:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_EXEC_CUSTOM_ALLOW_PATTERNS" json:"custom_allow_patterns"`
TimeoutSeconds int ` env:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_EXEC_TIMEOUT_SECONDS" json:"timeout_seconds"` // 0 means use default (60s)
EnvSet map[string]string ` json:"env_set"` // env vars to set for all exec commands
EnvAllowlist []string ` json:"env_allowlist"` // additional env vars to allow (extends default) - use explicit names, not wildcards
}
type SkillsToolsConfig struct {

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@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import (
"time"
"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/config"
"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/tools/shell"
)
type ExecTool struct {
@ -23,6 +24,7 @@ type ExecTool struct {
allowPatterns []*regexp.Regexp
customAllowPatterns []*regexp.Regexp
restrictToWorkspace bool
cachedEnv map[string]string // cached sanitized env from os.Getenv() at init
}
var (
@ -136,6 +138,22 @@ func NewExecToolWithConfig(workingDir string, restrict bool, config *config.Conf
timeout = time.Duration(config.Tools.Exec.TimeoutSeconds) * time.Second
}
// Get envSet and envAllowlist from config (if provided)
var envSet map[string]string
var envAllowlist []string
if config != nil && config.Tools.Exec.EnvSet != nil {
envSet = config.Tools.Exec.EnvSet
}
if config != nil && config.Tools.Exec.EnvAllowlist != nil {
envAllowlist = config.Tools.Exec.EnvAllowlist
}
// Ensure PICOCLAW_* vars are set for child processes
envSet = shell.WithPicoclawEnvVars(envSet, workingDir)
// Build cached env: start with envSet (PICOCLAW_*), then add allowed inherited vars
cachedEnv := shell.WithAllowedEnv(envSet, envAllowlist)
return &ExecTool{
workingDir: workingDir,
timeout: timeout,
@ -143,6 +161,7 @@ func NewExecToolWithConfig(workingDir string, restrict bool, config *config.Conf
allowPatterns: nil,
customAllowPatterns: customAllowPatterns,
restrictToWorkspace: restrict,
cachedEnv: cachedEnv,
}, nil
}
@ -166,6 +185,13 @@ func (t *ExecTool) Parameters() map[string]any {
"type": "string",
"description": "Optional working directory for the command",
},
"env": map[string]any{
"type": "object",
"description": "Additional environment variables to set for this command. Available: PICOCLAW_HOME, PICOCLAW_CONFIG, PICOCLAW_AGENT_WORKSPACE, PICOCLAW_EXE, PICOCLAW_SERVICE_NAME, PICOCLAW_EXEC_TIME (RFC3339), PICOCLAW_EXEC_TIMEOUT. Cannot override: PATH, HOME, USER, LOGNAME, SHELL, LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, LD_AUDIT, LD_DEBUG, PICOCLAW_*",
"additionalProperties": map[string]any{
"type": "string",
},
},
},
"required": []string{"command"},
}
@ -217,6 +243,28 @@ func (t *ExecTool) Execute(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) *ToolResult
} else {
cmd = exec.CommandContext(cmdCtx, "sh", "-c", command)
}
// Parse env param from LLM (if provided)
var extraEnv map[string]string
if envArg, ok := args["env"].(map[string]any); ok && envArg != nil {
extraEnv = make(map[string]string)
for k, v := range envArg {
if strVal, ok := v.(string); ok {
extraEnv[k] = strVal
}
}
}
// Add PICOCLAW_EXEC_TIME - timestamp when command is executed
execTimeEnv := map[string]string{
"PICOCLAW_EXEC_TIME": time.Now().Format(time.RFC3339),
"PICOCLAW_EXEC_TIMEOUT": t.timeout.String(),
}
// Use sanitized environment - merge cached env with exec time vars and LLM extra env
// Note: cachedEnv is NOT re-filtered - PICOCLAW_* vars are preserved
cmd.Env = shell.MergeEnvVars(t.cachedEnv, execTimeEnv, extraEnv)
if cwd != "" {
cmd.Dir = cwd
}

316
pkg/tools/shell/env.go Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
package shell
import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"strings"
)
// DefaultEnvAllowlist is the set of environment variable names that are safe
// to propagate to child processes. Everything else is stripped to prevent
// accidental credential leakage.
//
// To add a new variable:
// 1. Add to this map if it's safe to pass through
// 2. Or add a prefix to defaultEnvAllowPrefixes for pattern matching
// Note: Do NOT add wildcard patterns like "*_API_KEY" here - use explicit names
// to avoid accidentally leaking secrets.
var DefaultEnvAllowlist = map[string]bool{
"PATH": true,
"HOME": true,
"USER": true,
"LANG": true,
"SHELL": true,
"TERM": true,
"PWD": true,
"OLDPWD": true,
"HOSTNAME": true,
"LOGNAME": true,
"TZ": true,
"DISPLAY": true,
"TMPDIR": true,
"EDITOR": true,
"PAGER": true,
"HTTP_PROXY": true,
"HTTPS_PROXY": true,
"NO_PROXY": true,
// Locale
"LC_ALL": true,
"LC_CTYPE": true,
"LC_MESSAGES": true,
"LC_MONETARY": true,
"LC_NUMERIC": true,
"LC_TIME": true,
"LC_PAPER": true,
"LC_NAME": true,
"LC_ADDRESS": true,
"LC_TELEPHONE": true,
"LC_MEASUREMENT": true,
"LC_IDENTIFICATION": true,
"LC_COLLATE": true,
}
// defaultEnvAllowPrefixes are env var prefixes that are always allowed.
// Currently empty - all allowed vars are explicit in DefaultEnvAllowlist.
var defaultEnvAllowPrefixes = []string{
// Currently empty - all allowed vars are explicit
}
// LLMBlocklist is the set of environment variable names that the LLM
// cannot override, even if passed via the env parameter. These vars
// control fundamental process behavior and could be exploited.
var LLMBlocklist = map[string]bool{
"PATH": true, // Could hijack command resolution
"HOME": true, // Could redirect file access
"USER": true, // Could impersonate user
"LOGNAME": true, // Could impersonate user
"SHELL": true, // Could change shell behavior
"LD_PRELOAD": true, // Could inject code
"LD_LIBRARY_PATH": true, // Could hijack library resolution
"LD_AUDIT": true, // Could inject code
"LD_DEBUG": true, // Could leak info
// PICOCLAW_* vars - controlled by the agent, not LLM
"PICOCLAW_HOME": true,
"PICOCLAW_CONFIG": true,
"PICOCLAW_AGENT_WORKSPACE": true,
"PICOCLAW_EXE": true,
"PICOCLAW_SERVICE_NAME": true,
"PICOCLAW_EXEC_TIME": true,
"PICOCLAW_EXEC_TIMEOUT": true,
}
// windowsEnvAllowlist contains additional variables needed on Windows.
var windowsEnvAllowlist = map[string]bool{
"PATHEXT": true,
"SYSTEMROOT": true,
"SYSTEMDRIVE": true,
"COMSPEC": true,
"APPDATA": true,
"USERPROFILE": true,
"HOMEDRIVE": true,
"HOMEPATH": true,
}
// WithAllowedEnv builds a map of allowed environment variables by looking them up.
// This is more efficient than filtering os.Environ() with string parsing.
// It starts with the provided env map, then adds allowed inherited vars (if not set).
// extraAllowlist adds to the default allowlist.
func WithAllowedEnv(envSet map[string]string, extraAllowlist []string) map[string]string {
// Start with provided envSet map
result := envSet
if result == nil {
result = make(map[string]string)
}
// Add default allowlist (only if not already set)
for k := range DefaultEnvAllowlist {
if _, exists := result[k]; !exists {
if val := os.Getenv(k); val != "" {
result[k] = val
}
}
}
// Add Windows-specific vars
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
for k := range windowsEnvAllowlist {
if _, exists := result[k]; !exists {
if val := os.Getenv(k); val != "" {
result[k] = val
}
}
}
}
// Add extra allowlist from config
for _, k := range extraAllowlist {
if _, exists := result[k]; !exists {
if val := os.Getenv(k); val != "" {
result[k] = val
}
}
}
return result
}
// LLMBlocklistPrefixes are env var prefixes that the LLM cannot override.
var LLMBlocklistPrefixes = []string{
"PICOCLAW_",
}
// isBlocked returns true if the key is in the blocklist or matches a blocked prefix.
func isBlocked(key string) bool {
norm := envKey(key)
if LLMBlocklist[norm] {
return true
}
for _, prefix := range LLMBlocklistPrefixes {
if strings.HasPrefix(norm, prefix) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// MergeEnvVars merges multiple env sources into a final []string for exec.Cmd.Env.
// baseEnv is the cached map from AllowedEnv.
// envSet provides explicit key=value pairs (config, not filtered).
// extraEnv provides additional key=value pairs from LLM (filtered by blocklist).
func MergeEnvVars(baseEnv map[string]string, envSet, extraEnv map[string]string) []string {
vars := make(map[string]string, len(baseEnv)+len(envSet)+len(extraEnv))
// Start with base env (already filtered)
for k, v := range baseEnv {
vars[envKey(k)] = v
}
// Add envSet (config-provided, not filtered)
if envSet != nil {
for k, v := range envSet {
vars[envKey(k)] = v
}
}
// Merge extraEnv (LLM-provided) - filtered by blocklist
if extraEnv != nil {
for k, v := range extraEnv {
if isBlocked(k) {
continue // Skip blocked vars
}
vars[envKey(k)] = v
}
}
// Convert to []string for exec.Cmd.Env
result := make([]string, 0, len(vars))
for k, v := range vars {
result = append(result, k+"="+v)
}
return result
}
// BuildSanitizedEnv constructs a sanitized environment []string suitable for
// exec.Cmd.Env. It filters the inherited environment to only allowlisted variables.
//
// baseEnv is the inherited environment (e.g., from os.Environ() or cached).
// If nil, os.Environ() will be used for backwards compatibility.
// extraAllowlist adds additional variable names to the default allowlist.
// envSet provides explicit key=value pairs from config (override inherited).
// extraEnv provides additional key=value pairs from tool call (merged with envSet).
func BuildSanitizedEnv(baseEnv []string, extraAllowlist []string, envSet, extraEnv map[string]string) []string {
// Use provided env or fall back to os.Environ
inherited := baseEnv
if inherited == nil {
inherited = os.Environ()
}
allowed := make(map[string]bool, len(DefaultEnvAllowlist)+len(extraAllowlist)+len(windowsEnvAllowlist))
for k := range DefaultEnvAllowlist {
allowed[envKey(k)] = true
}
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
for k := range windowsEnvAllowlist {
allowed[envKey(k)] = true
}
}
for _, k := range extraAllowlist {
allowed[envKey(k)] = true
}
vars := make(map[string]string, len(allowed)+len(envSet)+len(extraEnv))
for _, entry := range inherited {
k, v, ok := strings.Cut(entry, "=")
if !ok {
continue
}
norm := envKey(k)
if allowed[norm] || isAllowedPrefix(norm) {
vars[norm] = v
}
}
if envSet != nil {
for k, v := range envSet {
vars[envKey(k)] = v
}
}
// Merge extraEnv (tool call) - highest priority
// Filter against LLM blocklist to prevent override of sensitive vars
if extraEnv != nil {
for k, v := range extraEnv {
if LLMBlocklist[envKey(k)] {
continue // Skip blocked vars
}
vars[envKey(k)] = v
}
}
// Convert to []string for exec.Cmd.Env
result := make([]string, 0, len(vars))
for k, v := range vars {
result = append(result, k+"="+v)
}
return result
}
// envKey normalizes an environment variable name. On Windows, where env
// vars are case-insensitive, it uppercases the key so that "Path" and
// "PATH" map to the same entry. On other platforms it's a no-op.
func envKey(k string) string {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
return strings.ToUpper(k)
}
return k
}
func isAllowedPrefix(name string) bool {
for _, prefix := range defaultEnvAllowPrefixes {
if strings.HasPrefix(name, prefix) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// WithPicoclawEnvVars ensures PICOCLAW_* vars are set in envSet.
// These are needed for child processes to locate config, workspace, etc.
func WithPicoclawEnvVars(envSet map[string]string, workspace string) map[string]string {
if envSet == nil {
envSet = make(map[string]string)
}
// Always compute PICOCLAW_* vars - priority: env var > default
if v := os.Getenv("PICOCLAW_HOME"); v != "" {
envSet["PICOCLAW_HOME"] = v
} else if home, _ := os.UserHomeDir(); home != "" {
envSet["PICOCLAW_HOME"] = filepath.Join(home, ".picoclaw")
}
if v := os.Getenv("PICOCLAW_CONFIG"); v != "" {
envSet["PICOCLAW_CONFIG"] = v
} else if home := envSet["PICOCLAW_HOME"]; home != "" {
envSet["PICOCLAW_CONFIG"] = filepath.Join(home, "config.json")
}
// Workspace - this is the agent's working directory
if workspace != "" {
envSet["PICOCLAW_AGENT_WORKSPACE"] = workspace
}
if exe, err := os.Executable(); err == nil {
envSet["PICOCLAW_EXE"] = exe
}
if v := os.Getenv("PICOCLAW_SERVICE_NAME"); v != "" {
envSet["PICOCLAW_SERVICE_NAME"] = v
} else {
envSet["PICOCLAW_SERVICE_NAME"] = "picoclaw"
}
return envSet
}