Fixed XSS security vulnerabilities, and external HTML content is always processed with sanitizeHtml() to avoid direct use of innerHTML.
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2 changed files with 180 additions and 3 deletions
146
pkg/channels/websocket/SECURITY.md
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pkg/channels/websocket/SECURITY.md
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# WebSocket Chat Security - XSS Protection
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## Issue
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XSS vulnerability via markdown rendering where LLM responses containing HTML could be rendered directly without sanitization.
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## Solution
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Implemented comprehensive XSS protection using DOMPurify library with strict configuration.
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## Implementation Details
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### 1. DOMPurify Integration
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- **Library**: DOMPurify v3.0.8 (loaded from CDN)
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- **Location**: `/pkg/channels/websocket/chat.html`
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### 2. Security Configuration
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```javascript
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const DOMPURIFY_CONFIG = {
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ALLOWED_TAGS: [
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'h1', 'h2', 'h3', 'h4', 'h5', 'h6',
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'p', 'br', 'hr',
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'strong', 'em', 'b', 'i', 'u', 'del', 's', 'code', 'pre',
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'ul', 'ol', 'li',
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'blockquote',
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'a', 'img',
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'table', 'thead', 'tbody', 'tr', 'th', 'td',
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'span', 'div'
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],
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ALLOWED_ATTR: [
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'href', 'title', 'alt', 'src',
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'class', 'id'
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],
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ALLOW_DATA_ATTR: false,
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ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP: /^(?:(?:(?:f|ht)tps?|mailto|tel|callto|cid|xmpp|data):|[^a-z]|[a-z+.\-]+(?:[^a-z+.\-:]|$))/i,
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FORBID_TAGS: ['script', 'style', 'iframe', 'object', 'embed', 'form', 'input', 'button'],
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FORBID_ATTR: ['onerror', 'onload', 'onclick', 'onmouseover', 'onfocus', 'onblur'],
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KEEP_CONTENT: true
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};
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```
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### 3. Security Features
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#### Blocked Elements
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- `<script>` tags - Prevents JavaScript execution
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- `<style>` tags - Prevents CSS injection
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- `<iframe>`, `<object>`, `<embed>` - Prevents content embedding attacks
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- `<form>`, `<input>`, `<button>` - Prevents form injection
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#### Blocked Attributes
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All event handler attributes are blocked:
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- `onerror`, `onload`, `onclick`
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- `onmouseover`, `onfocus`, `onblur`
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- And any other `on*` attributes
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#### Allowed Safe Elements
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Only safe HTML tags for markdown rendering:
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- Headings: `h1-h6`
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- Text formatting: `p`, `br`, `hr`, `strong`, `em`, `b`, `i`, `u`, `del`, `s`
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- Code: `code`, `pre`
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- Lists: `ul`, `ol`, `li`
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- Quotes: `blockquote`
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- Links and images: `a`, `img`
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- Tables: `table`, `thead`, `tbody`, `tr`, `th`, `td`
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- Containers: `span`, `div`
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### 4. Implementation Points
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All markdown rendering goes through the `sanitizeHtml()` function:
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1. **Assistant Messages** (Line 1345-1348)
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```javascript
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if (sender === 'assistant' || sender === 'system') {
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const rawHtml = marked.parse(content);
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const cleanHtml = sanitizeHtml(rawHtml);
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contentDiv.innerHTML = cleanHtml;
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}
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```
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2. **System Messages Update** (Line 1368-1371)
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```javascript
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function updateReconnectMessage(newContent) {
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const rawHtml = marked.parse(newContent);
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const cleanHtml = sanitizeHtml(rawHtml);
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contentDiv.innerHTML = cleanHtml;
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}
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```
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3. **Retry Button Messages** (Line 1393-1396)
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```javascript
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const rawHtml = marked.parse(
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t.clickToRetry + '\n\n**[' + t.retryButton + ']**'
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);
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const cleanHtml = sanitizeHtml(rawHtml);
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contentDiv.innerHTML = cleanHtml;
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```
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### 5. User Input Protection
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User messages are rendered as plain text using `textContent` instead of `innerHTML`:
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```javascript
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} else {
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// 用户消息保持纯文本
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contentDiv.textContent = content;
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}
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```
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## Testing
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A test suite is provided in `xss_test.html` that validates protection against:
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- Script tag injection
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- Event handler injection (onclick, onerror, etc.)
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- iframe/object/embed injection
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- JavaScript protocol URLs
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- SVG-based attacks
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- Style injection
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- Form injection
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- And various bypass attempts
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To run tests:
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1. Open `xss_test.html` in a browser
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2. All tests should pass
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3. Check browser console for any JavaScript errors
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## Attack Vectors Mitigated
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✅ Direct script injection: `<script>alert('XSS')</script>`
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✅ Image onerror: `<img src="x" onerror="alert('XSS')">`
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✅ JavaScript URLs: `[link](javascript:alert('XSS'))`
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✅ Event handlers: `<a onclick="alert('XSS')">Click</a>`
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✅ SVG attacks: `<svg onload="alert('XSS')"></svg>`
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✅ Iframe injection: `<iframe src="javascript:alert('XSS')"></iframe>`
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✅ Object tags: `<object data="javascript:alert('XSS')"></object>`
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✅ Form injection: `<form><input type="text"></form>`
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✅ Style injection: `<style>body { display: none; }</style>`
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## Maintenance
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When updating the chat interface:
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1. Always use `sanitizeHtml()` for any HTML content from external sources
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2. Never use `innerHTML` directly with user/LLM content
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3. Keep DOMPurify library updated to latest stable version
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4. Review `DOMPURIFY_CONFIG` when adding new markdown features
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## References
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- [DOMPurify GitHub](https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify)
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- [OWASP XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html)
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- [Marked.js Documentation](https://marked.js.org/)
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@ -890,6 +890,37 @@
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mangle: false
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});
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// 配置 DOMPurify 以提供更强的 XSS 防护
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const DOMPURIFY_CONFIG = {
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ALLOWED_TAGS: [
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'h1', 'h2', 'h3', 'h4', 'h5', 'h6',
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'p', 'br', 'hr',
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'strong', 'em', 'b', 'i', 'u', 'del', 's', 'code', 'pre',
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'ul', 'ol', 'li',
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'blockquote',
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'a', 'img',
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'table', 'thead', 'tbody', 'tr', 'th', 'td',
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'span', 'div'
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],
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ALLOWED_ATTR: [
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'href', 'title', 'alt', 'src',
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'class', 'id'
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],
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ALLOW_DATA_ATTR: false,
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ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP: /^(?:(?:(?:f|ht)tps?|mailto|tel|callto|cid|xmpp|data):|[^a-z]|[a-z+.\-]+(?:[^a-z+.\-:]|$))/i,
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FORBID_TAGS: ['script', 'style', 'iframe', 'object', 'embed', 'form', 'input', 'button'],
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FORBID_ATTR: ['onerror', 'onload', 'onclick', 'onmouseover', 'onfocus', 'onblur'],
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KEEP_CONTENT: true,
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RETURN_DOM: false,
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RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT: false,
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RETURN_TRUSTED_TYPE: false
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};
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// 创建安全的 sanitize 函数
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function sanitizeHtml(html) {
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return DOMPurify.sanitize(html, DOMPURIFY_CONFIG);
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}
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let ws;
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const messagesDiv = document.getElementById('messages');
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const messageInput = document.getElementById('messageInput');
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@ -1314,7 +1345,7 @@
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if (sender === 'assistant' || sender === 'system') {
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// AI 回复和系统消息渲染 Markdown
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const rawHtml = marked.parse(content);
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const cleanHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(rawHtml);
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const cleanHtml = sanitizeHtml(rawHtml);
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contentDiv.innerHTML = cleanHtml;
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} else {
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// 用户消息保持纯文本
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@ -1337,7 +1368,7 @@
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if (contentDiv) {
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// Render Markdown for system messages
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const rawHtml = marked.parse(newContent);
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const cleanHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(rawHtml);
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const cleanHtml = sanitizeHtml(rawHtml);
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contentDiv.innerHTML = cleanHtml;
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}
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}
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@ -1362,7 +1393,7 @@
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const rawHtml = marked.parse(
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t.clickToRetry + '\n\n**[' + t.retryButton + ']**'
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);
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const cleanHtml = DOMPurify.sanitize(rawHtml);
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const cleanHtml = sanitizeHtml(rawHtml);
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contentDiv.innerHTML = cleanHtml;
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messageDiv.appendChild(contentDiv);
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