Fix security vulnerabilities from review (CRIT-1 through MED-6)

CRIT-1: Remove hardcoded Google OAuth client secret; credentials are now
read from GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID / GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET env vars. Removed the
decodeBase64 helper that existed only to obfuscate the embedded secret.

CRIT-2 + MED-3: Add RequireLocalOrigin middleware to the launcher API
server. All /api/ and /auth/ routes now reject requests whose Origin
header is present but doesn't match http://localhost:18800 or
http://127.0.0.1:18800, blocking browser-based CSRF attacks.

CRIT-3 + HIGH-5: Split shell deny patterns into absoluteDenyPatterns
(always enforced, cannot be overridden) and defaultDenyPatterns
(overridable by customAllowPatterns). Added missing patterns for nc/ncat,
python -c, perl -e, ruby -e, nohup, crontab, authorized_keys writes,
shell startup file writes, and base64-piped execution. |/bin/sh and
|/bin/bash are now also covered.

HIGH-1: Replace cmd /c start <url> with rundll32 url.dll,FileProtocolHandler
on Windows in OpenBrowser to prevent cmd.exe shell metacharacter injection.
Added URL scheme validation before opening any browser URL.

HIGH-2: Apply io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20) to all io.ReadAll calls
on OAuth HTTP response bodies (RequestDeviceCode, LoginDeviceCode,
pollDeviceCode, RefreshAccessToken, ExchangeCodeForTokens,
fetchGoogleUserEmail) to prevent OOM from malicious token endpoints.

HIGH-3: Add maxOAuthSessions = 50 cap; handleGoogleAntigravityLogin now
returns 429 when the limit is reached, preventing unbounded map growth.

HIGH-4: Escape all attacker-controlled strings written into HTML responses
in handleOAuthCallback using html.EscapeString, fixing reflected XSS via
the ?error= query parameter.

HIGH-6: Replace math/rand with crypto/rand in randomString() in
antigravity_provider.go using crypto/rand.Int + math/big.Int.

MED-1: Add validGitHubRepo regex validation in InstallFromGitHub to
reject repo names containing path traversal, query strings, fragments,
or characters outside [A-Za-z0-9_.-].

MED-2: Add rejectSSRFTarget() in WebFetchTool that resolves the hostname
and rejects loopback, link-local, private, and cloud metadata (169.254.x)
addresses, preventing prompt-injected SSRF to the launcher API or cloud
instance metadata endpoints.

MED-6: Canonicalize path with filepath.Clean before running pattern
matching in whitelistFs.matches() to prevent regex bypass via embedded
traversal sequences like /allowed/path/../../../etc/shadow.

https://claude.ai/code/session_01AerxPcDs78ntotTwbyYiVd

cmd/picoclaw-launcher/internal/server/auth_handlers.go

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package server
 import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
+	"html"
 	"io"
 	"log"
 	"net/http"
@@ -13,6 +14,11 @@ import (
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/providers"
 )
 
+// maxOAuthSessions limits the number of concurrent in-flight OAuth sessions to
+// prevent an unauthenticated caller from growing the in-memory session map without
+// bound (HIGH-3: DoS via unlimited session creation).
+const maxOAuthSessions = 50
+
 // oauthSession stores in-flight OAuth state for browser-based flows.
 type oauthSession struct {
 	Provider    string
@@ -186,8 +192,13 @@ func handleGoogleAntigravityLogin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, config
 
 	authURL := auth.BuildAuthorizeURL(oauthCfg, pkce, state, redirectURI)
 
-	// Store session for callback
+	// Enforce session count limit before storing the new session.
 	oauthSessionsMu.Lock()
+	if len(oauthSessions) >= maxOAuthSessions {
+		oauthSessionsMu.Unlock()
+		http.Error(w, "Too many pending OAuth sessions; please try again later", http.StatusTooManyRequests)
+		return
+	}
 	oauthSessions[state] = &oauthSession{
 		Provider:    "google-antigravity",
 		PKCE:        pkce,
@@ -232,8 +243,10 @@ func handleOAuthCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 
 	if code == "" {
-		errMsg := r.URL.Query().Get("error")
+		// Escape the attacker-controlled query parameter before writing it into HTML
-		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
+		// to prevent reflected XSS (HIGH-4).
+		errMsg := html.EscapeString(r.URL.Query().Get("error"))
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
 		fmt.Fprintf(
 			w,
 			`<html><body><h2>Authentication failed</h2><p>%s</p><p>You can close this window.</p></body></html>`,
@@ -244,11 +257,11 @@ func handleOAuthCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 
 	cred, err := auth.ExchangeCodeForTokens(session.OAuthCfg, code, session.PKCE.CodeVerifier, session.RedirectURI)
 	if err != nil {
-		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
 		fmt.Fprintf(
 			w,
 			`<html><body><h2>Authentication failed</h2><p>%s</p><p>You can close this window.</p></body></html>`,
-			err.Error(),
+			html.EscapeString(err.Error()),
 		)
 		return
 	}
@@ -266,8 +279,8 @@ func handleOAuthCallback(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 	}
 
 	if err := auth.SetCredential(session.Provider, cred); err != nil {
-		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html")
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
-		fmt.Fprintf(w, `<html><body><h2>Failed to save credentials</h2><p>%s</p></body></html>`, err.Error())
+		fmt.Fprintf(w, `<html><body><h2>Failed to save credentials</h2><p>%s</p></body></html>`, html.EscapeString(err.Error()))
 		return
 	}
 
@@ -297,7 +310,7 @@ func fetchGoogleUserEmail(accessToken string) (string, error) {
 	}
 	defer resp.Body.Close()
 
-	body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
 	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
 		return "", fmt.Errorf("userinfo request failed: %s", string(body))
 	}

cmd/picoclaw-launcher/internal/server/server.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"log"
 	"net/http"
+	"strings"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/auth"
@@ -14,6 +15,47 @@ import (
 
 const DefaultPort = "18800"
 
+// allowedOrigins are the origins from which browser requests to the API are accepted.
+// Any request whose Origin header is set but doesn't match one of these is rejected.
+var allowedOrigins = []string{
+	"http://localhost:" + DefaultPort,
+	"http://127.0.0.1:" + DefaultPort,
+}
+
+// RequireLocalOrigin is HTTP middleware that rejects cross-origin requests to
+// the launcher API. It blocks browser-based CSRF attacks (any browser tab can
+// attempt a cross-origin fetch, but the browser always sends the real Origin
+// header which we validate here). Requests without an Origin header (direct
+// curl/tool access from localhost) are permitted.
+func RequireLocalOrigin(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		origin := r.Header.Get("Origin")
+		if origin != "" {
+			allowed := false
+			for _, o := range allowedOrigins {
+				if strings.EqualFold(origin, o) {
+					allowed = true
+					break
+				}
+			}
+			if !allowed {
+				http.Error(w, "Forbidden: cross-origin request rejected", http.StatusForbidden)
+				return
+			}
+		}
+		// Set CORS headers so the UI (same origin) works correctly and other
+		// origins are explicitly denied by the browser.
+		w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "http://localhost:"+DefaultPort)
+		w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, PUT, OPTIONS")
+		w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type")
+		if r.Method == http.MethodOptions {
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+			return
+		}
+		next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+	})
+}
+
 // providerStatus represents the auth status of a single provider in API responses.
 type providerStatus struct {
 	Provider   string `json:"provider"`

cmd/picoclaw-launcher/main.go

@@ -67,15 +67,20 @@ func main() {
 		addr = "127.0.0.1:" + server.DefaultPort
 	}
 
-	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	apiMux := http.NewServeMux()
-	server.RegisterConfigAPI(mux, absPath)
+	server.RegisterConfigAPI(apiMux, absPath)
-	server.RegisterAuthAPI(mux, absPath)
+	server.RegisterAuthAPI(apiMux, absPath)
-	server.RegisterProcessAPI(mux, absPath)
+	server.RegisterProcessAPI(apiMux, absPath)
 
 	staticFS, err := fs.Sub(staticFiles, "internal/ui")
 	if err != nil {
 		log.Fatalf("Failed to create sub filesystem: %v", err)
 	}
+
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	// All /api/ and /auth/ routes are protected by the local-origin CSRF guard.
+	mux.Handle("/api/", server.RequireLocalOrigin(apiMux))
+	mux.Handle("/auth/", server.RequireLocalOrigin(apiMux))
 	mux.Handle("/", http.FileServer(http.FS(staticFS)))
 
 	// Print startup banner

pkg/auth/oauth.go

@@ -41,13 +41,18 @@ func OpenAIOAuthConfig() OAuthProviderConfig {
 }
 
 // GoogleAntigravityOAuthConfig returns the OAuth configuration for Google Cloud Code Assist (Antigravity).
-// Client credentials are the same ones used by OpenCode/pi-ai for Cloud Code Assist access.
+// Credentials are read from GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID and GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET environment variables.
+// You must register your own OAuth 2.0 credentials at https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/credentials
+// and set these environment variables before using Google authentication.
 func GoogleAntigravityOAuthConfig() OAuthProviderConfig {
-	// These are the same client credentials used by the OpenCode antigravity plugin.
+	clientID := os.Getenv("GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID")
-	clientID := decodeBase64(
+	clientSecret := os.Getenv("GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET")
-		"MTA3MTAwNjA2MDU5MS10bWhzc2luMmgyMWxjcmUyMzV2dG9sb2poNGc0MDNlcC5hcHBzLmdvb2dsZXVzZXJjb250ZW50LmNvbQ==",
+	if clientID == "" || clientSecret == "" {
-	)
+		// Warn loudly — shared credentials should not be used in production.
-	clientSecret := decodeBase64("R09DU1BYLUs1OEZXUjQ4NkxkTEoxbUxCOHNYQzR6NnFEQWY=")
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "WARNING: GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID and/or GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET are not set.")
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "         Google OAuth will not function without valid credentials.")
+		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "         Register your own at https://console.cloud.google.com/apis/credentials")
+	}
 	return OAuthProviderConfig{
 		Issuer:       "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2",
 		TokenURL:     "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token",
@@ -58,14 +63,6 @@ func GoogleAntigravityOAuthConfig() OAuthProviderConfig {
 	}
 }
 
-func decodeBase64(s string) string {
-	data, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(s)
-	if err != nil {
-		return s
-	}
-	return string(data)
-}
-
 // GenerateState generates a random state string for OAuth CSRF protection.
 func GenerateState() (string, error) {
 	buf := make([]byte, 32)
@@ -212,7 +209,7 @@ func RequestDeviceCode(cfg OAuthProviderConfig) (*DeviceCodeInfo, error) {
 	}
 	defer resp.Body.Close()
 
-	body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
 	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("device code request failed: %s", string(body))
 	}
@@ -300,7 +297,7 @@ func LoginDeviceCode(cfg OAuthProviderConfig) (*AuthCredential, error) {
 	}
 	defer resp.Body.Close()
 
-	body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
 	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("device code request failed: %s", string(body))
 	}
@@ -360,7 +357,7 @@ func pollDeviceCode(cfg OAuthProviderConfig, deviceAuthID, userCode string) (*Au
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("pending")
 	}
 
-	body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
 
 	var tokenResp struct {
 		AuthorizationCode string `json:"authorization_code"`
@@ -401,7 +398,7 @@ func RefreshAccessToken(cred *AuthCredential, cfg OAuthProviderConfig) (*AuthCre
 	}
 	defer resp.Body.Close()
 
-	body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
 	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("token refresh failed: %s", string(body))
 	}
@@ -494,7 +491,7 @@ func ExchangeCodeForTokens(cfg OAuthProviderConfig, code, codeVerifier, redirect
 	}
 	defer resp.Body.Close()
 
-	body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	body, _ := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
 	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("token exchange failed: %s", string(body))
 	}
@@ -608,14 +605,25 @@ func base64URLDecode(s string) ([]byte, error) {
 }
 
 // OpenBrowser opens the given URL in the user's default browser.
-func OpenBrowser(url string) error {
+// Each platform call passes the URL as a discrete argument to avoid shell interpretation.
+func OpenBrowser(rawURL string) error {
+	// Validate the URL before passing it to a browser launcher.
+	parsed, err := url.Parse(rawURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("invalid URL: %w", err)
+	}
+	if parsed.Scheme != "http" && parsed.Scheme != "https" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("refusing to open non-http(s) URL: %s", parsed.Scheme)
+	}
 	switch runtime.GOOS {
 	case "darwin":
-		return exec.Command("open", url).Start()
+		return exec.Command("open", rawURL).Start()
 	case "linux":
-		return exec.Command("xdg-open", url).Start()
+		return exec.Command("xdg-open", rawURL).Start()
 	case "windows":
-		return exec.Command("cmd", "/c", "start", url).Start()
+		// Use rundll32 instead of "cmd /c start" to avoid cmd.exe shell metacharacter
+		// interpretation (e.g., '&', '|', '^' in URLs would execute commands via cmd.exe).
+		return exec.Command("rundll32", "url.dll,FileProtocolHandler", rawURL).Start()
 	default:
 		return fmt.Errorf("unsupported platform: %s", runtime.GOOS)
 	}

pkg/providers/antigravity_provider.go

@@ -4,10 +4,11 @@ import (
 	"bufio"
 	"bytes"
 	"context"
+	cryptorand "crypto/rand"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
-	"math/rand"
+	"math/big"
 	"net/http"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
@@ -758,8 +759,17 @@ func truncateString(s string, maxLen int) string {
 func randomString(n int) string {
 	const letters = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"
 	b := make([]byte, n)
+	max := big.NewInt(int64(len(letters)))
 	for i := range b {
-		b[i] = letters[rand.Intn(len(letters))]
+		idx, err := cryptorand.Int(cryptorand.Reader, max)
+		if err != nil {
+			// Fall back to a fixed character rather than panicking; callers use
+			// this only for non-secret request IDs, so degraded randomness is
+			// acceptable in the unlikely event crypto/rand fails.
+			b[i] = letters[0]
+			continue
+		}
+		b[i] = letters[idx.Int64()]
 	}
 	return string(b)
 }

pkg/skills/installer.go

@@ -7,12 +7,18 @@ import (
 	"net/http"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"regexp"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/fileutil"
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/utils"
 )
 
+// validGitHubRepo matches "owner/repo" where owner and repo contain only
+// alphanumeric characters, hyphens, underscores, and dots — no path traversal,
+// query strings, fragments, or null bytes.
+var validGitHubRepo = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$`)
+
 type SkillInstaller struct {
 	workspace string
 }
@@ -24,6 +30,9 @@ func NewSkillInstaller(workspace string) *SkillInstaller {
 }
 
 func (si *SkillInstaller) InstallFromGitHub(ctx context.Context, repo string) error {
+	if !validGitHubRepo.MatchString(repo) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("invalid GitHub repo name %q: must be in 'owner/repo' format using only alphanumeric characters, hyphens, underscores, and dots", repo)
+	}
 	skillDir := filepath.Join(si.workspace, "skills", filepath.Base(repo))
 
 	if _, err := os.Stat(skillDir); err == nil {

pkg/tools/filesystem.go

@@ -398,8 +398,12 @@ type whitelistFs struct {
 }
 
 func (w *whitelistFs) matches(path string) bool {
+	// Canonicalize the path before pattern matching to prevent bypass via
+	// embedded traversal sequences (e.g. /allowed/path/../../../etc/shadow
+	// would match the "/allowed/path" prefix but resolve elsewhere).
+	canonical := filepath.Clean(path)
 	for _, p := range w.patterns {
-		if p.MatchString(path) {
+		if p.MatchString(canonical) {
 			return true
 		}
 	}

pkg/tools/shell.go

@@ -26,35 +26,48 @@ type ExecTool struct {
 }
 
 var (
-	defaultDenyPatterns = []*regexp.Regexp{
+	// absoluteDenyPatterns are always blocked regardless of customAllowPatterns.
+	// These cover the most dangerous command patterns that should never be executed.
+	absoluteDenyPatterns = []*regexp.Regexp{
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\brm\s+-[rf]{1,2}\b`),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\bdel\s+/[fq]\b`),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\brmdir\s+/s\b`),
-		// Match disk wiping commands (must be followed by space/args)
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\b(format|mkfs|diskpart)\b\s`),
-		regexp.MustCompile(
-			`\b(format|mkfs|diskpart)\b\s`,
-		),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\bdd\s+if=`),
-		// Block writes to block devices (all common naming schemes).
 		regexp.MustCompile(
 			`>\s*/dev/(sd[a-z]|hd[a-z]|vd[a-z]|xvd[a-z]|nvme\d|mmcblk\d|loop\d|dm-\d|md\d|sr\d|nbd\d)`,
 		),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\b(shutdown|reboot|poweroff)\b`),
-		regexp.MustCompile(`:\(\)\s*\{.*\};\s*:`),
+		regexp.MustCompile(`:\(\)\s*\{.*\};\s*:`), // fork bomb
-		regexp.MustCompile(`\$\([^)]+\)`),
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\$\([^)]+\)`),          // command substitution $()
-		regexp.MustCompile(`\$\{[^}]+\}`),
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\$\{[^}]+\}`),           // variable substitution ${}
-		regexp.MustCompile("`[^`]+`"),
+		regexp.MustCompile("`[^`]+`"),               // backtick substitution
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\|\s*sh\b`),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\|\s*bash\b`),
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\|\s*(\/bin\/)?sh\b`),
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\|\s*(\/bin\/)?bash\b`),
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\bbase64\b.*\|\s*(sh|bash|(\/bin\/)?(sh|bash))\b`),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`;\s*rm\s+-[rf]`),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`&&\s*rm\s+-[rf]`),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\|\|\s*rm\s+-[rf]`),
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\bsudo\b`),
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\beval\b`),
+		// Persist via cron/at/startup files
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\bcrontab\b`),
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\bat\s+now\b`),
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\.ssh[/\\]authorized_keys\b`),
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\.(bashrc|bash_profile|profile|zshrc|zprofile)\b`),
+		// Network exfiltration
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\b(nc|ncat|netcat)\b`),
+	}
+
+	defaultDenyPatterns = []*regexp.Regexp{
+		// Additional patterns that can be overridden by customAllowPatterns
 		regexp.MustCompile(`<<\s*EOF`),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\$\(\s*cat\s+`),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\$\(\s*curl\s+`),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\$\(\s*wget\s+`),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\$\(\s*which\s+`),
-		regexp.MustCompile(`\bsudo\b`),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\bchmod\s+[0-7]{3,4}\b`),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\bchown\b`),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\bpkill\b`),
@@ -72,8 +85,12 @@ var (
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\bgit\s+push\b`),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\bgit\s+force\b`),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\bssh\b.*@`),
-		regexp.MustCompile(`\beval\b`),
 		regexp.MustCompile(`\bsource\s+.*\.sh\b`),
+		// Script interpreters running inline code
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\bpython[23]?\s+-c\b`),
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\bperl\s+-e\b`),
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\bruby\s+-e\b`),
+		regexp.MustCompile(`\bnohup\b`),
 	}
 
 	// absolutePathPattern matches absolute file paths in commands (Unix and Windows).
@@ -291,7 +308,14 @@ func (t *ExecTool) guardCommand(command, cwd string) string {
 	cmd := strings.TrimSpace(command)
 	lower := strings.ToLower(cmd)
 
-	// Custom allow patterns exempt a command from deny checks.
+	// Absolute deny patterns are always enforced — customAllowPatterns cannot bypass them.
+	for _, pattern := range absoluteDenyPatterns {
+		if pattern.MatchString(lower) {
+			return "Command blocked by safety guard (dangerous pattern detected)"
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Custom allow patterns can exempt a command from the configurable deny checks below.
 	explicitlyAllowed := false
 	for _, pattern := range t.customAllowPatterns {
 		if pattern.MatchString(lower) {

pkg/tools/web.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
+	"net"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/url"
 	"regexp"
@@ -666,6 +667,44 @@ func NewWebFetchToolWithProxy(maxChars int, proxy string, fetchLimitBytes int64)
 	}, nil
 }
 
+// rejectSSRFTarget returns an error if the URL targets an address that should
+// not be reachable from an agent tool: loopback, link-local, private ranges,
+// and cloud metadata endpoints. This prevents prompt-injected instructions from
+// exfiltrating data via the local launcher API or cloud instance metadata.
+func rejectSSRFTarget(u *url.URL) error {
+	hostname := u.Hostname()
+
+	// Resolve the hostname to catch DNS-based SSRF.
+	// Use the literal hostname for IP checks before DNS resolution too.
+	ips, err := net.LookupHost(hostname)
+	if err != nil {
+		// If we can't resolve it, let the HTTP client fail naturally.
+		// The important case is when we CAN resolve it and it's private.
+		ips = []string{hostname}
+	}
+
+	for _, ipStr := range ips {
+		ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)
+		if ip == nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		if ip.IsLoopback() {
+			return fmt.Errorf("SSRF protection: requests to loopback addresses are not allowed")
+		}
+		if ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() {
+			return fmt.Errorf("SSRF protection: requests to link-local addresses are not allowed")
+		}
+		if ip.IsPrivate() {
+			return fmt.Errorf("SSRF protection: requests to private network addresses are not allowed")
+		}
+		// Block cloud metadata endpoints (AWS, GCP, Azure all use 169.254.169.254).
+		if ip.Equal(net.ParseIP("169.254.169.254")) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("SSRF protection: requests to cloud metadata endpoints are not allowed")
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 func (t *WebFetchTool) Name() string {
 	return "web_fetch"
 }
@@ -711,6 +750,10 @@ func (t *WebFetchTool) Execute(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) *ToolRe
 		return ErrorResult("missing domain in URL")
 	}
 
+	if err := rejectSSRFTarget(parsedURL); err != nil {
+		return ErrorResult(err.Error())
+	}
+
 	maxChars := t.maxChars
 	if mc, ok := args["maxChars"].(float64); ok {
 		if int(mc) > 100 {