fix(security): replace regex path detection with token-based analysis in exec guard
The old regex `/[^\s\"']+` falsely matched slashes in relative paths (e.g., "tests/cold/file.py" → "/cold/file.py") as absolute paths, blocking legitimate commands. Windows path regex also truncated at the first backslash segment. Replace with strings.Fields + filepath.IsAbs for accurate absolute path detection, and add isExecutable() check to allow system binary invocation (e.g., /usr/bin/python, .exe) outside the workspace while still blocking data file access. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
dj-oyu
parent
90f8f5cc0c
commit
dc5b98cbcc
2 changed files with 249 additions and 5 deletions
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@ -256,21 +256,29 @@ func (t *ExecTool) guardCommand(command, cwd string) string {
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return ""
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}
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pathPattern := regexp.MustCompile(`[A-Za-z]:\\[^\\\"']+|/[^\s\"']+`)
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matches := pathPattern.FindAllString(cmd, -1)
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// Token-based absolute path detection.
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// Uses strings.Fields instead of regex to avoid false positives
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// from slashes in relative paths (e.g., "tests/cold/file.py").
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// Flags like -I/usr/local/include are naturally skipped because
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// filepath.IsAbs returns false for tokens starting with "-".
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for _, token := range strings.Fields(cmd) {
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token = strings.Trim(token, "\"'")
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for _, raw := range matches {
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p, err := filepath.Abs(raw)
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if err != nil {
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if !filepath.IsAbs(token) {
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continue
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}
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p := filepath.Clean(token)
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rel, err := filepath.Rel(cwdPath, p)
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if err != nil {
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continue
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}
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if strings.HasPrefix(rel, "..") {
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// Path is outside workspace — allow if it's an executable binary
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if isExecutable(p) {
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continue
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}
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return "Command blocked by safety guard (path outside working dir)"
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}
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}
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@ -279,6 +287,28 @@ func (t *ExecTool) guardCommand(command, cwd string) string {
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return ""
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}
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// isExecutable checks if a path points to an executable file.
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// On Unix, checks the execute permission bits.
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// On Windows, checks for known executable extensions.
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func isExecutable(path string) bool {
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info, err := os.Stat(path)
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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if info.IsDir() {
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return false
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}
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if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
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ext := strings.ToLower(filepath.Ext(path))
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switch ext {
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case ".exe", ".cmd", ".bat", ".ps1", ".com":
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return true
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}
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return false
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}
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return info.Mode()&0111 != 0
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}
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func (t *ExecTool) SetTimeout(timeout time.Duration) {
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t.timeout = timeout
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}
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@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import (
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"context"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"runtime"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"time"
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@ -208,3 +209,216 @@ func TestShellTool_RestrictToWorkspace(t *testing.T) {
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t.Errorf("Expected 'blocked' message for path traversal, got ForLLM: %s, ForUser: %s", result.ForLLM, result.ForUser)
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}
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}
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// --- guardCommand unit tests ---
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// TestGuardCommand_RelativePathWithSlashes verifies that relative paths
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// containing slashes (e.g., tests/cold/test.py, projects/terra-py-form)
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// are NOT falsely blocked. This was a regression caused by the old regex
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// matching "/cold/test.py" from "tests/cold/test.py" as an absolute path.
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func TestGuardCommand_RelativePathWithSlashes(t *testing.T) {
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workspace := t.TempDir()
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tool := NewExecTool(workspace, true)
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cmds := []string{
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"pytest tests/cold/test_solver.py -v --tb=short",
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"cd projects/terra-py-form && pytest",
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"uv run pytest tests/cold/test_solver.py -v --tb=short",
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"cat src/terra_py_form/cold/parser.py",
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"python src/main.py --config config/dev.json",
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}
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for _, cmd := range cmds {
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result := tool.guardCommand(cmd, workspace)
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if result != "" {
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t.Errorf("Relative path should not be blocked: %q → %s", cmd, result)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestGuardCommand_VenvBinary verifies that .venv/bin/... paths are allowed
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// (they are relative paths, not absolute).
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func TestGuardCommand_VenvBinary(t *testing.T) {
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workspace := t.TempDir()
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tool := NewExecTool(workspace, true)
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cmds := []string{
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".venv/bin/python -m pytest",
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".venv/bin/pytest tests/ -v",
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".venv/bin/pip install -e .",
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}
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for _, cmd := range cmds {
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result := tool.guardCommand(cmd, workspace)
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if result != "" {
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t.Errorf("Venv relative path should not be blocked: %q → %s", cmd, result)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestGuardCommand_ExecutableBinaryAllowed verifies that absolute paths
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// to executable files outside the workspace are allowed (system binaries).
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func TestGuardCommand_ExecutableBinaryAllowed(t *testing.T) {
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if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
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t.Skip("Unix executable permission test not applicable on Windows")
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}
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workspace := t.TempDir()
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externalDir := t.TempDir()
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// Create a fake executable outside the workspace
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execPath := filepath.Join(externalDir, "mybin")
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os.WriteFile(execPath, []byte("#!/bin/sh\necho ok"), 0755)
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tool := NewExecTool(workspace, true)
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cmd := execPath + " --help"
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result := tool.guardCommand(cmd, workspace)
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if result != "" {
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t.Errorf("Executable binary outside workspace should be allowed: %q → %s", cmd, result)
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}
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}
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// TestGuardCommand_ExecutableBinaryAllowed_Windows verifies that .exe files
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// outside the workspace are allowed on Windows.
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func TestGuardCommand_ExecutableBinaryAllowed_Windows(t *testing.T) {
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if runtime.GOOS != "windows" {
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t.Skip("Windows-specific test")
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}
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workspace := t.TempDir()
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externalDir := t.TempDir()
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// Create a fake .exe outside the workspace
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execPath := filepath.Join(externalDir, "tool.exe")
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os.WriteFile(execPath, []byte("MZ"), 0644)
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tool := NewExecTool(workspace, true)
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cmd := execPath + " --version"
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result := tool.guardCommand(cmd, workspace)
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if result != "" {
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t.Errorf("Windows .exe outside workspace should be allowed: %q → %s", cmd, result)
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}
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}
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// TestGuardCommand_NonExecutableOutsideBlocked verifies that non-executable
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// files outside the workspace are blocked (e.g., reading /etc/shadow).
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func TestGuardCommand_NonExecutableOutsideBlocked(t *testing.T) {
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if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
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t.Skip("Unix permission test not applicable on Windows")
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}
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workspace := t.TempDir()
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externalDir := t.TempDir()
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// Create a regular (non-executable) file outside workspace
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dataFile := filepath.Join(externalDir, "secret.txt")
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os.WriteFile(dataFile, []byte("secret data"), 0644)
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tool := NewExecTool(workspace, true)
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cmd := "cat " + dataFile
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result := tool.guardCommand(cmd, workspace)
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if result == "" {
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t.Errorf("Non-executable file outside workspace should be blocked: %q", cmd)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(result, "path outside working dir") {
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t.Errorf("Expected 'path outside working dir' message, got: %s", result)
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}
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}
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// TestGuardCommand_NonExistentAbsolutePathBlocked verifies that absolute
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// paths that don't exist are blocked (could be file creation outside workspace).
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func TestGuardCommand_NonExistentAbsolutePathBlocked(t *testing.T) {
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workspace := t.TempDir()
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tool := NewExecTool(workspace, true)
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// Use platform-appropriate absolute path
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var cmd string
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if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
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cmd = "echo hello > C:\\nonexistent_picoclaw_test_output"
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} else {
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cmd = "echo hello > /tmp/nonexistent_picoclaw_test_output"
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}
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result := tool.guardCommand(cmd, workspace)
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if result == "" {
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t.Errorf("Non-existent absolute path outside workspace should be blocked: %q", cmd)
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}
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}
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// TestGuardCommand_FlagEmbeddedPathSkipped verifies that paths embedded in
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// flags (e.g., -I/usr/local/include) are NOT extracted as absolute paths
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// because the token starts with "-", not "/".
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func TestGuardCommand_FlagEmbeddedPathSkipped(t *testing.T) {
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workspace := t.TempDir()
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tool := NewExecTool(workspace, true)
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cmds := []string{
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"gcc -I/usr/local/include -L/usr/lib main.c",
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"g++ -std=c++17 -I/opt/include file.cpp",
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"python --prefix=/usr/local script.py",
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}
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for _, cmd := range cmds {
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result := tool.guardCommand(cmd, workspace)
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if result != "" {
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t.Errorf("Flag-embedded path should not be blocked: %q → %s", cmd, result)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestGuardCommand_AbsolutePathInsideWorkspace verifies that absolute paths
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// within the workspace are always allowed.
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func TestGuardCommand_AbsolutePathInsideWorkspace(t *testing.T) {
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workspace := t.TempDir()
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tool := NewExecTool(workspace, true)
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innerDir := filepath.Join(workspace, "projects", "myapp")
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os.MkdirAll(innerDir, 0755)
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cmd := "ls " + innerDir
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result := tool.guardCommand(cmd, workspace)
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if result != "" {
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t.Errorf("Absolute path inside workspace should be allowed: %q → %s", cmd, result)
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}
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}
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// TestGuardCommand_PathTraversal verifies that various path traversal
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// patterns are blocked.
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func TestGuardCommand_PathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
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workspace := t.TempDir()
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tool := NewExecTool(workspace, true)
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cmds := []string{
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"cat ../../etc/passwd",
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"cat ../../../etc/shadow",
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"ls projects/../../../../etc",
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}
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for _, cmd := range cmds {
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result := tool.guardCommand(cmd, workspace)
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if result == "" {
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t.Errorf("Path traversal should be blocked: %q", cmd)
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}
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if !strings.Contains(result, "path traversal") {
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t.Errorf("Expected 'path traversal' message, got: %s", result)
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}
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}
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}
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// TestGuardCommand_CdWithAbsoluteWorkspacePath verifies that cd to an
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// absolute path within the workspace followed by other commands is allowed.
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func TestGuardCommand_CdWithAbsoluteWorkspacePath(t *testing.T) {
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workspace := t.TempDir()
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innerDir := filepath.Join(workspace, "projects", "foo")
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os.MkdirAll(innerDir, 0755)
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tool := NewExecTool(workspace, true)
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cmd := "cd " + innerDir + " && ls -la"
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result := tool.guardCommand(cmd, workspace)
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if result != "" {
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t.Errorf("cd to workspace subdir should be allowed: %q → %s", cmd, result)
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}
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}
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