diff --git a/config/config.example.json b/config/config.example.json
index e7730f828..0c5e24166 100644
--- a/config/config.example.json
+++ b/config/config.example.json
@@ -424,8 +424,9 @@
         "^unzip\\b",
         "^tar\\b",
         "^git\\b",
-        "^rm\\s+(?!.*-[rR])\\S"
-      ]
+        "^rm\\s+[^-]"
+      ],
+      "exec_admins": []
     },
     "skills": {
       "enabled": true,
diff --git a/pkg/agent/loop.go b/pkg/agent/loop.go
index f33be48fd..d90de2959 100644
--- a/pkg/agent/loop.go
+++ b/pkg/agent/loop.go
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/commands"
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/config"
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/constants"
+	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/identity"
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/logger"
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/mcp"
 	"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/media"
@@ -64,16 +65,17 @@ type AgentLoop struct {
 
 // processOptions configures how a message is processed
 type processOptions struct {
-	SessionKey      string   // Session identifier for history/context
-	Channel         string   // Target channel for tool execution
-	ChatID          string   // Target chat ID for tool execution
-	UserMessage     string   // User message content (may include prefix)
-	Media           []string // media:// refs from inbound message
-	DefaultResponse string   // Response when LLM returns empty
-	EnableSummary   bool     // Whether to trigger summarization
-	SendResponse    bool     // Whether to send response via bus
-	NoHistory       bool     // If true, don't load session history (for heartbeat)
-	WorkingDir      string   // Current working directory override (for hipico from cmd mode)
+	SessionKey      string         // Session identifier for history/context
+	Channel         string         // Target channel for tool execution
+	ChatID          string         // Target chat ID for tool execution
+	UserMessage     string         // User message content (may include prefix)
+	Media           []string       // media:// refs from inbound message
+	DefaultResponse string         // Response when LLM returns empty
+	EnableSummary   bool           // Whether to trigger summarization
+	SendResponse    bool           // Whether to send response via bus
+	NoHistory       bool           // If true, don't load session history (for heartbeat)
+	WorkingDir      string         // Current working directory override (for hipico from cmd mode)
+	Sender          bus.SenderInfo // Sender identity for per-user permission checks
 }
 
 const (
@@ -722,6 +724,7 @@ func (al *AgentLoop) processMessage(ctx context.Context, msg bus.InboundMessage)
 		EnableSummary:   true,
 		SendResponse:    false,
 		WorkingDir:      msg.Metadata["work_dir"],
+		Sender:          msg.Sender,
 	}
 
 	// In cmd mode, rewrite bare text as /exec so all shell execution flows
@@ -1962,7 +1965,8 @@ func (al *AgentLoop) buildCommandsRuntime(agent *AgentInstance, opts *processOpt
 			if agent == nil {
 				return "", fmt.Errorf("no agent available")
 			}
-			return al.executeCmdMode(ctx, agent, command, opts.SessionKey, opts.Channel, opts.ChatID)
+			isAdmin := al.isExecAdmin(opts.Sender)
+			return al.executeCmdMode(ctx, agent, command, opts.SessionKey, opts.Channel, opts.ChatID, isAdmin)
 		},
 
 		// One-shot AI query for /hipico (stays in modeCmd, separate session key)
@@ -2025,12 +2029,26 @@ func mapCommandError(result commands.ExecuteResult) string {
 	return fmt.Sprintf("Failed to execute /%s: %v", result.Command, result.Err)
 }
 
+// isExecAdmin returns true if the sender is listed in tools.exec.exec_admins,
+// using the same identity matching as channel allow_from.
+func (al *AgentLoop) isExecAdmin(sender bus.SenderInfo) bool {
+	admins := al.cfg.Tools.Exec.ExecAdmins
+	for _, admin := range admins {
+		if identity.MatchAllowed(sender, admin) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 // executeCmdMode executes a shell command in command mode via ExecTool.
 // Output is formatted as a console code block for channel display.
+// isAdmin bypasses all command guards for verified exec admins.
 func (al *AgentLoop) executeCmdMode(
 	ctx context.Context,
 	agent *AgentInstance,
 	content, sessionKey, channel, chatID string,
+	isAdmin bool,
 ) (string, error) {
 	content = strings.TrimSpace(content)
 	if content == "" {
@@ -2053,11 +2071,23 @@ func (al *AgentLoop) executeCmdMode(
 		workDir = agent.Workspace
 	}
 
-	// Execute via ExecTool
-	result := agent.Tools.ExecuteWithContext(ctx, "exec", map[string]any{
+	execArgs := map[string]any{
 		"command":     content,
 		"working_dir": workDir,
-	}, channel, chatID, nil)
+	}
+
+	// Execute via ExecTool — admins bypass command guards
+	var result *tools.ToolResult
+	if isAdmin {
+		if t, ok := agent.Tools.Get("exec"); ok {
+			if et, ok := t.(*tools.ExecTool); ok {
+				result = et.ExecuteUnrestricted(ctx, execArgs)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if result == nil {
+		result = agent.Tools.ExecuteWithContext(ctx, "exec", execArgs, channel, chatID, nil)
+	}
 
 	displayDir := shortenHomePath(workDir)
 	output := result.ForLLM
diff --git a/pkg/config/config.go b/pkg/config/config.go
index 02791e740..69c222b43 100644
--- a/pkg/config/config.go
+++ b/pkg/config/config.go
@@ -678,6 +678,9 @@ type ExecConfig struct {
 	// When non-empty and DevMode is false, only commands matching at least one pattern are permitted;
 	// deny patterns are bypassed — the whitelist is the sole access control.
 	AllowedCommands []string `env:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_EXEC_ALLOWED_COMMANDS" json:"allowed_commands"`
+	// ExecAdmins lists sender identities (same format as channel allow_from) that are granted
+	// unrestricted shell execution regardless of DevMode or AllowedCommands.
+	ExecAdmins []string `env:"PICOCLAW_TOOLS_EXEC_ADMINS" json:"exec_admins"`
 }
 
 type SkillsToolsConfig struct {
diff --git a/pkg/tools/shell.go b/pkg/tools/shell.go
index 55dd7c8f9..ef2ff273c 100644
--- a/pkg/tools/shell.go
+++ b/pkg/tools/shell.go
@@ -179,7 +179,17 @@ func (t *ExecTool) Parameters() map[string]any {
 	}
 }
 
+// ExecuteUnrestricted executes a command bypassing all command guards.
+// Use only after the caller has verified the sender is an exec admin.
+func (t *ExecTool) ExecuteUnrestricted(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) *ToolResult {
+	return t.execute(ctx, args, true)
+}
+
 func (t *ExecTool) Execute(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) *ToolResult {
+	return t.execute(ctx, args, false)
+}
+
+func (t *ExecTool) execute(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any, adminOverride bool) *ToolResult {
 	command, ok := args["command"].(string)
 	if !ok {
 		return ErrorResult("command is required")
@@ -205,7 +215,7 @@ func (t *ExecTool) Execute(ctx context.Context, args map[string]any) *ToolResult
 		}
 	}
 
-	if guardError := t.guardCommand(command, cwd); guardError != "" {
+	if guardError := t.guardCommand(command, cwd, adminOverride); guardError != "" {
 		return ErrorResult(guardError)
 	}
 
@@ -310,9 +320,9 @@ func sanitizeCommand(cmd string) string {
 	return cmd
 }
 
-func (t *ExecTool) guardCommand(command, cwd string) string {
-	// Dev mode: no restrictions at all.
-	if t.devMode {
+func (t *ExecTool) guardCommand(command, cwd string, adminOverride bool) string {
+	// Dev mode or exec admin: no restrictions at all.
+	if t.devMode || adminOverride {
 		return ""
 	}
 
diff --git a/pkg/tools/shell_test.go b/pkg/tools/shell_test.go
index 4721da5cd..68854834e 100644
--- a/pkg/tools/shell_test.go
+++ b/pkg/tools/shell_test.go
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ func TestGuardCommand_URLEncodedTraversal(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	tool.SetRestrictToWorkspace(true)
 
-	msg := tool.guardCommand("cat %2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc/passwd", tmpDir)
+	msg := tool.guardCommand("cat %2e%2e%2f%2e%2e%2fetc/passwd", tmpDir, false)
 	if msg == "" {
 		t.Error("Expected URL-encoded path traversal to be blocked")
 	}
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ func TestGuardCommand_NullByte(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	tool.SetRestrictToWorkspace(true)
 
-	msg := tool.guardCommand("cat foo\x00../../etc/passwd", tmpDir)
+	msg := tool.guardCommand("cat foo\x00../../etc/passwd", tmpDir, false)
 	if msg == "" {
 		t.Error("Expected null-byte traversal to be blocked")
 	}
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ func TestGuardCommand_SuBlocked(t *testing.T) {
 
 	cases := []string{"su", "su -", "su root", "doas ls", "pkexec /bin/bash"}
 	for _, cmd := range cases {
-		msg := tool.guardCommand(cmd, tmpDir)
+		msg := tool.guardCommand(cmd, tmpDir, false)
 		if msg == "" {
 			t.Errorf("Expected %q to be blocked", cmd)
 		}
@@ -420,7 +420,7 @@ func TestGuardCommand_SuNoFalsePositive(t *testing.T) {
 
 	cases := []string{"echo surplus", "cat summary.txt", "ls result/"}
 	for _, cmd := range cases {
-		msg := tool.guardCommand(cmd, tmpDir)
+		msg := tool.guardCommand(cmd, tmpDir, false)
 		if msg != "" {
 			t.Errorf("Expected %q to NOT be blocked, got: %s", cmd, msg)
 		}