* feat(cli): add workspace, config-dir, tools, and skills override flags Add --workspace, --config-dir, --tools, and --skills flags to `picoclaw agent` for single-shot invocations. Supports workspace override with bootstrap file injection (AGENTS.md, IDENTITY.md, SOUL.md, USER.md), tool allowlisting, and skills filtering. Also extracts FormatSkillsSummary from SkillsLoader for reuse, adds SetSkillsFilter to ContextBuilder, and wires SkillsFilter from agent config into the context builder. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(channels): add MagicForm webhook channel plugin Implement MagicForm channel for webhook-based agentic task delegation. Supports Bearer token auth, async processing with HTTP callback, workspace path validation against configurable workspace_root, bootstrap file injection, tool/skill filtering via metadata, and per-conversation session key isolation. Includes Bus() accessor on BaseChannel for direct message publishing, MagicFormConfig with workspace_root for path traversal prevention, request body size limits, and TTL cleanup for stale request contexts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(agent): support per-request workspace, tool, and skill overrides Add workspace override, tool allowlisting, and skills filtering to the agent loop via processOptions metadata. When a workspace override is active (e.g. from MagicForm channel), creates isolated SessionManager and ContextBuilder instances per request. Threads effSessions/effContextBuilder through all downstream paths including runLLMIteration, forceCompression, maybeSummarize, and summarizeSession to ensure full workspace isolation. Adds defense-in- depth tool execution guard alongside LLM-facing tool definition filter. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(auth): add response body size limits to OAuth HTTP calls Wrap all io.ReadAll(resp.Body) calls in the OAuth flow with io.LimitReader capped at 1 MB to prevent memory exhaustion from malicious or unexpectedly large server responses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(tools): add response body size limits to search providers Add 2 MB LimitReader to BraveSearch, Tavily, DuckDuckGo, and Perplexity search providers to prevent memory exhaustion from unexpectedly large responses. Matches existing pattern used by GLMSearchProvider. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(tools): add 20 MB file write size limit Reject writes exceeding 20 MB in WriteFileTool to prevent disk exhaustion from unexpectedly large LLM-generated file content. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(tools): use crypto/rand for temp file naming Replace predictable PID+nanosecond temp file names with cryptographically random hex strings to prevent symlink pre-placement attacks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(skills): validate GitHub repo format and limit download size Add regex validation for 'owner/repo' format to prevent URL injection in InstallFromGitHub. Add 5 MB LimitReader on skill file downloads to prevent memory exhaustion. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(auth): allow OAuth credentials to be overridden via env vars Add PICOCLAW_OPENAI_CLIENT_ID, PICOCLAW_GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID, and PICOCLAW_GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET env var overrides. Hardcoded values remain as fallback defaults for backward compatibility. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(auth): sanitize OAuth error messages Replace raw HTTP response bodies in error messages with generic status-code-only messages. Full response details are logged at debug level for troubleshooting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(launcher): HTML-escape error messages in auth callback Use html.EscapeString on all error text rendered in HTML responses to prevent XSS via crafted OAuth error parameters or error messages. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(launcher): remove internal details from HTTP error responses Log detailed errors server-side and return generic messages to clients to prevent information disclosure of file paths and internal state. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(launcher): add HTTP security headers middleware Add SecurityHeaders middleware setting X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, and Content-Security-Policy on all responses to mitigate MIME sniffing, clickjacking, and content injection. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(skills): validate ClawHub registry base URL scheme Reject non-HTTPS registry URLs (unless localhost) to prevent config-based redirection to malicious skill servers. Falls back to the default https://clawhub.ai with a warning. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(skills): prevent workspace skills from shadowing builtins Builtin skill names are now reserved — workspace and global skills with the same name as a builtin are skipped with a warning log. LoadSkill also checks builtins first. This prevents supply chain attacks where a malicious skill replaces a trusted builtin. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(skills): warn when safety metadata is unavailable Add MetadataAvailable flag to InstallResult. When the registry metadata fetch fails (silent fallback), the user now sees a warning that safety checks could not be completed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * security(shell): add opt-in environment variable filtering When filter_env is enabled in config, shell commands run with a minimal allowlist of environment variables (PATH, HOME, LANG, TERM, etc. plus PICOCLAW_* prefix), preventing accidental leakage of sensitive env vars like API keys to spawned processes. Disabled by default for backward compat. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(config): add workspace-local config.json overlay for per-tenant isolation Support per-workspace config overrides via --config-dir (CLI) or configDir (webhook), enabling different API keys, models, and agent settings per tenant. - Add LoadWorkspaceConfig/MergeWorkspaceConfig with raw JSON overlay to preserve unmentioned bool fields (prevents clobbering tool enabled flags) - Add Config.Clone() for safe per-request config copies in gateway mode - Gateway: per-request provider creation from workspace config, with effProvider/effModel threaded through all LLM call sites and summarization - CLI: workspace config merged before provider creation, CLI flags win - MagicForm: replace inline bootstrap fields with configDir path; agent loop copies bootstrap files and loads config.json from configDir - Fix --session flag: format as agent:main:cli:{key} so router honors it - Fix cron session key: format as agent:main:cron:{id} for isolation - Add shared CopyBootstrapFiles helper in pkg/agent/bootstrap.go - Add config/workspace.config.example.json Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(agent): honor workspace config overrides in model routing selectCandidates uses agent.Model/Candidates baked in at startup, which ignores per-request workspace config overrides (effProvider/effModel). When the workspace overrides the provider, skip routing and fallback candidates entirely to avoid cross-provider credential issues. When only the model is overridden, allow routing but use the effective model. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: fix linter errors (gci, gofumpt, golines, govet, unused) - gci: alphabetize magicform import in gateway/helpers.go - gofumpt: reformat multi-line function signature in agent/helpers.go - golines: wrap lines exceeding 120 chars across 5 files - govet: rename shadowed variables (err → wcErr, s → trimmed) - unused: remove maybeSummarize, forceCompression, summarizeSession wrappers superseded by their *With variants Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: nuestraai <nuestraai@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: admin-mf <admin@magicform.ai>
420 lines
12 KiB
Go
420 lines
12 KiB
Go
package magicform
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net/http"
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"path/filepath"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/bus"
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"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/channels"
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"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/config"
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"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/logger"
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)
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// WebhookPayload is the inbound payload from MagicForm.
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type WebhookPayload struct {
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StackID string `json:"stackId"`
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ConversationID string `json:"conversationId"`
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UserID string `json:"userId"`
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Message string `json:"message"`
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Workspace string `json:"workspace"` // e.g. "s1/c1" — agent working directory (relative to workspace_root)
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ConfigDir string `json:"configDir,omitempty"` // e.g. "s1/config" — pre-provisioned config directory (relative to workspace_root)
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CallbackURL string `json:"callbackUrl"`
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// Tool/skill filtering
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AllowedTools []string `json:"allowedTools,omitempty"` // Tool allowlist (empty = all)
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AllowedSkills []string `json:"allowedSkills,omitempty"` // Skill filter (empty = all)
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}
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// CallbackPayload is the outbound payload sent back to MagicForm.
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type CallbackPayload struct {
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StackID string `json:"stackId"`
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ConversationID string `json:"conversationId"`
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Response string `json:"response"`
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Type string `json:"type"` // "final"
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}
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// requestContext stores per-request state so Send() can resolve callback info.
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type requestContext struct {
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stackID string
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conversationID string
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userID string
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callbackURL string
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createdAt time.Time
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}
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// MagicFormChannel implements the MagicForm channel plugin.
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type MagicFormChannel struct {
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*channels.BaseChannel
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config config.MagicFormConfig
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httpClient *http.Client
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requests sync.Map // chatID → *requestContext
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ctx context.Context
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cancel context.CancelFunc
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}
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// NewMagicFormChannel creates a new MagicForm channel.
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func NewMagicFormChannel(cfg config.MagicFormConfig, msgBus *bus.MessageBus) (*MagicFormChannel, error) {
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base := channels.NewBaseChannel(
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"magicform",
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cfg,
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msgBus,
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cfg.AllowFrom,
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)
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ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
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ch := &MagicFormChannel{
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BaseChannel: base,
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config: cfg,
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httpClient: &http.Client{
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Timeout: 30 * time.Second,
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},
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ctx: ctx,
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cancel: cancel,
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}
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base.SetOwner(ch)
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return ch, nil
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}
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// Start begins the channel and starts the TTL cleanup goroutine.
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func (c *MagicFormChannel) Start(_ context.Context) error {
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c.SetRunning(true)
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// Background goroutine to clean up stale request contexts
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go c.cleanupLoop()
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logger.InfoCF("magicform", "MagicForm channel started", nil)
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return nil
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}
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// Stop shuts down the channel.
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func (c *MagicFormChannel) Stop(_ context.Context) error {
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c.cancel()
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c.SetRunning(false)
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logger.InfoCF("magicform", "MagicForm channel stopped", nil)
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return nil
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}
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// WebhookPath returns the HTTP path for the inbound webhook.
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func (c *MagicFormChannel) WebhookPath() string {
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if c.config.WebhookPath != "" {
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return c.config.WebhookPath
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}
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return "/hooks/magicform"
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}
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// HealthPath returns the HTTP path for the health check endpoint.
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func (c *MagicFormChannel) HealthPath() string {
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return "/health/magicform"
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}
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// HealthHandler handles the health check HTTP request.
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func (c *MagicFormChannel) HealthHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]string{
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"status": "ok",
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"channel": "magicform",
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})
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}
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// maxWebhookBodySize is the maximum allowed size for inbound webhook payloads (1 MB).
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const maxWebhookBodySize = 1 << 20
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// ServeHTTP handles inbound webhook requests from MagicForm.
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func (c *MagicFormChannel) ServeHTTP(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
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http.Error(w, "Method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
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return
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}
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// Limit request body size to prevent memory exhaustion
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r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxWebhookBodySize)
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body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "Request body too large", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
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return
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}
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defer r.Body.Close()
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// Verify Bearer token
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if !c.verifyToken(r) {
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http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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var payload WebhookPayload
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if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &payload); err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "Invalid JSON", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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// Validate required fields
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if payload.StackID == "" || payload.ConversationID == "" || payload.Message == "" {
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http.Error(w, "Missing required fields: stackId, conversationId, message", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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// Validate workspace path: must be relative and resolve under workspace_root
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if payload.Workspace != "" {
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resolved, err := c.resolveWorkspace(payload.Workspace)
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("Invalid workspace: %v", err), http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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payload.Workspace = resolved
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}
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// Validate configDir path against workspace_root
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if payload.ConfigDir != "" {
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resolved, err := c.resolveWorkspace(payload.ConfigDir)
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("Invalid configDir: %v", err), http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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payload.ConfigDir = resolved
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}
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// Return 200 immediately, process asynchronously
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
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go c.processWebhook(c.ctx, payload)
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}
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// resolveWorkspace validates and resolves the workspace path.
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// If workspace_root is configured, the workspace must be a relative path that
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// resolves under the root. If workspace_root is not configured, workspace is
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// rejected (no arbitrary path writes allowed).
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func (c *MagicFormChannel) resolveWorkspace(workspace string) (string, error) {
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root := c.config.WorkspaceRoot
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if root == "" {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("workspace_root not configured; workspace overrides are not allowed")
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}
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absRoot, err := filepath.Abs(root)
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if err != nil {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid workspace_root: %w", err)
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}
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// Join the root with the provided workspace (which may be relative)
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resolved := filepath.Join(absRoot, workspace)
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resolved = filepath.Clean(resolved)
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// Ensure the resolved path is under the root (prevents ../../../etc traversal)
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if !strings.HasPrefix(resolved, absRoot+string(filepath.Separator)) && resolved != absRoot {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("workspace path escapes workspace_root")
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}
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return resolved, nil
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}
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// verifyToken checks the Authorization Bearer token using constant-time comparison.
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func (c *MagicFormChannel) verifyToken(r *http.Request) bool {
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if c.config.Token == "" {
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return true // No token configured = allow all (dev mode)
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}
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auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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if !strings.HasPrefix(auth, "Bearer ") {
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return false
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}
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token := strings.TrimPrefix(auth, "Bearer ")
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return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(token), []byte(c.config.Token)) == 1
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}
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// processWebhook handles an inbound webhook payload asynchronously.
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func (c *MagicFormChannel) processWebhook(ctx context.Context, p WebhookPayload) {
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// Check for shutdown before doing any work
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if ctx.Err() != nil {
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logger.WarnCF("magicform", "Skipping webhook processing: channel shutting down",
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map[string]any{"stack_id": p.StackID, "conversation_id": p.ConversationID})
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return
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}
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chatID := "magicform:" + p.ConversationID
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senderID := p.UserID
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if senderID == "" {
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senderID = "anonymous"
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}
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// Store request context for Send() to look up later
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c.requests.Store(chatID, &requestContext{
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stackID: p.StackID,
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conversationID: p.ConversationID,
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userID: p.UserID,
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callbackURL: p.CallbackURL,
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createdAt: time.Now(),
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})
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peer := bus.Peer{Kind: "direct", ID: p.ConversationID}
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sender := bus.SenderInfo{
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Platform: "magicform",
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PlatformID: senderID,
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CanonicalID: "magicform:" + senderID,
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}
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// Session key: per-stack per-conversation isolation
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sessionKey := fmt.Sprintf("agent:main:magicform:%s:%s", p.StackID, p.ConversationID)
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metadata := map[string]string{
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"platform": "magicform",
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"stack_id": p.StackID,
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"conversation_id": p.ConversationID,
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}
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if p.CallbackURL != "" {
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metadata["callback_url"] = p.CallbackURL
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}
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// Workspace override — agent loop will pick this up
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if p.Workspace != "" {
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metadata["workspace_override"] = p.Workspace
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}
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// Config directory — agent loop reads config.json and copies bootstrap files
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if p.ConfigDir != "" {
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metadata["config_dir"] = p.ConfigDir
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}
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// Tool/skill filtering — passed via metadata, picked up by agent loop
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if len(p.AllowedTools) > 0 {
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metadata["allowed_tools"] = strings.Join(trimSlice(p.AllowedTools), ",")
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}
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if len(p.AllowedSkills) > 0 {
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metadata["allowed_skills"] = strings.Join(trimSlice(p.AllowedSkills), ",")
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}
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messageID := fmt.Sprintf("mf-%s-%d", p.ConversationID, time.Now().UnixMilli())
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// Build InboundMessage directly (not via HandleMessage) to set SessionKey.
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// MagicForm is API-to-API, so typing/reaction/placeholder don't apply.
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msg := bus.InboundMessage{
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Channel: "magicform",
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SenderID: sender.CanonicalID,
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Sender: sender,
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ChatID: chatID,
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Content: p.Message,
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Peer: peer,
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MessageID: messageID,
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SessionKey: sessionKey,
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Metadata: metadata,
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}
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if err := c.Bus().PublishInbound(ctx, msg); err != nil {
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logger.ErrorCF("magicform", "Failed to publish inbound message",
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map[string]any{
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"chat_id": chatID,
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"stack_id": p.StackID,
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"conversation_id": p.ConversationID,
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"error": err.Error(),
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})
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}
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}
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// trimSlice trims whitespace from each element in the slice.
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func trimSlice(s []string) []string {
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out := make([]string, len(s))
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for i, v := range s {
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out[i] = strings.TrimSpace(v)
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}
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return out
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}
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// Send delivers the agent response back to MagicForm via HTTP callback.
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func (c *MagicFormChannel) Send(ctx context.Context, msg bus.OutboundMessage) error {
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if !c.IsRunning() {
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return channels.ErrNotRunning
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}
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// Look up request context
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val, ok := c.requests.LoadAndDelete(msg.ChatID)
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if !ok {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: no request context for chatID %s", channels.ErrSendFailed, msg.ChatID)
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}
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reqCtx := val.(*requestContext)
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// Resolve callback URL
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callbackURL := reqCtx.callbackURL
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if callbackURL == "" {
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callbackURL = c.config.BackendURL + "/claw-agent/callback"
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}
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if callbackURL == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: no callback URL available", channels.ErrSendFailed)
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}
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// Build callback payload
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payload := CallbackPayload{
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StackID: reqCtx.stackID,
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ConversationID: reqCtx.conversationID,
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Response: msg.Content,
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Type: "final",
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}
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body, err := json.Marshal(payload)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: marshal callback payload: %v", channels.ErrSendFailed, err)
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}
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req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, callbackURL, bytes.NewReader(body))
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("%w: create callback request: %v", channels.ErrSendFailed, err)
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}
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req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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if c.config.Token != "" {
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req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.config.Token)
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}
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resp, err := c.httpClient.Do(req)
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if err != nil {
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return channels.ClassifyNetError(err)
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}
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defer resp.Body.Close()
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if resp.StatusCode >= 400 {
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respBody, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
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return channels.ClassifySendError(resp.StatusCode, fmt.Errorf("callback error: %s", respBody))
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}
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logger.InfoCF("magicform", "Callback sent",
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map[string]any{
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"conversation_id": reqCtx.conversationID,
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"status": resp.StatusCode,
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})
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return nil
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}
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// cleanupLoop periodically removes stale request contexts.
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func (c *MagicFormChannel) cleanupLoop() {
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ticker := time.NewTicker(60 * time.Second)
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defer ticker.Stop()
|
|
|
|
for {
|
|
select {
|
|
case <-c.ctx.Done():
|
|
return
|
|
case <-ticker.C:
|
|
c.requests.Range(func(key, value any) bool {
|
|
rc := value.(*requestContext)
|
|
if time.Since(rc.createdAt) > 10*time.Minute {
|
|
c.requests.Delete(key)
|
|
logger.DebugCF("magicform", "Cleaned up stale request context",
|
|
map[string]any{"chat_id": key})
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|