picoclaw/pkg/security/policy/checker.go

70 lines
2 KiB
Go

package policy
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/pkg/agent"
)
// Config defines the security policy for tool execution.
type Config struct {
// RequiresApproval maps a tool name to a boolean.
// If true, the tool will always return Approved=false with a "requires human approval" reason.
RequiresApproval map[string]bool `json:"requires_approval"`
// DisallowedTools maps a tool name to a boolean.
// If true, the tool will be rejected without any human-in-the-loop option.
DisallowedTools map[string]bool `json:"disallowed_tools"`
// AllowedTools maps a tool name to a boolean.
// If set (non-empty), only tools in this map are allowed.
AllowedTools map[string]bool `json:"allowed_tools"`
}
// Checker implements the agent.ToolApprover interface.
type Checker struct {
Config Config
}
// Ensure Checker implements ToolApprover.
var _ agent.ToolApprover = (*Checker)(nil)
// NewChecker creates a new policy checker.
func NewChecker(cfg Config) *Checker {
return &Checker{Config: cfg}
}
func (c *Checker) ApproveTool(ctx context.Context, req *agent.ToolApprovalRequest) (agent.ApprovalDecision, error) {
if req == nil {
return agent.ApprovalDecision{Approved: false, Reason: "request is nil"}, nil
}
// 1. Explicit Disallow
if c.Config.DisallowedTools[req.Tool] {
return agent.ApprovalDecision{
Approved: false,
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("Tool %q is globally disallowed by security policy", req.Tool),
}, nil
}
// 2. Whitelisting (if enabled)
if len(c.Config.AllowedTools) > 0 {
if !c.Config.AllowedTools[req.Tool] {
return agent.ApprovalDecision{
Approved: false,
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("Tool %q is not in the allowed tools whitelist", req.Tool),
}, nil
}
}
// 3. Human Approval Required
if c.Config.RequiresApproval[req.Tool] {
return agent.ApprovalDecision{
Approved: false,
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("Tool %q requires explicit human approval", req.Tool),
}, nil
}
return agent.ApprovalDecision{Approved: true}, nil
}