picoclaw/pkg/tools/redact.go
Subash b743286fc5 fix(tools): address review — close async bypass, fix false positives
- Sanitize subagent callback results in subagent.go (the primary
  attack vector from #972 — async results bypassed ExecuteWithContext)
- Remove generic hex pattern that matched git SHAs, Docker digests,
  and checksums in go.sum/package-lock.json
- Order regex patterns most-specific-first to prevent partial matches
- Add Stripe key patterns (sk_live_, sk_test_, rk_live_, rk_test_)
- Fix IsSecretEnvVar false positives on AUTHOR, AUTHORITY, etc.
  by switching from substring to suffix matching
- Preserve error chain via Unwrap() on redactedError
- Use strings.Contains instead of custom helpers in tests
- Add idempotency test, git SHA preservation test, checksum test
2026-03-14 14:45:47 +05:30

136 lines
4.7 KiB
Go

package tools
import (
"regexp"
"strings"
)
// secretPatterns matches common API key and credential formats.
// Ordered from most specific to least specific to avoid partial matches.
// Each pattern is compiled once at package init and reused across calls.
var secretPatterns = []*regexp.Regexp{
// OpenRouter (sk-or-v1-...)
regexp.MustCompile(`sk-or-v1-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}`),
// Anthropic (sk-ant-...)
regexp.MustCompile(`sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}`),
// OpenAI project keys (sk-proj-...)
regexp.MustCompile(`sk-proj-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}`),
// OpenAI / OpenAI-compatible (sk-...)
regexp.MustCompile(`sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}`),
// Google AI / Gemini (AIza...)
regexp.MustCompile(`AIza[A-Za-z0-9_-]{30,}`),
// GitHub tokens (ghp_, gho_, ghu_, ghs_, ghr_)
regexp.MustCompile(`gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{30,}`),
// Slack tokens (xoxb-, xoxp-, xoxs-, xoxa-)
regexp.MustCompile(`xox[bpsa]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{20,}`),
// Discord bot tokens (base64.base64.base64)
regexp.MustCompile(`[MN][A-Za-z0-9]{23,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{6}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{27,}`),
// Stripe keys (sk_live_, sk_test_, rk_live_, rk_test_)
regexp.MustCompile(`[sr]k_(?:live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}`),
// AWS access keys (AKIA...)
regexp.MustCompile(`AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}`),
// AWS secret keys (40 char base64-ish after known prefixes)
regexp.MustCompile(`(?i)aws[_\-]?secret[_\-]?access[_\-]?key["'\s:=]+[A-Za-z0-9/+=]{40}`),
}
// NOTE: Generic hex patterns (e.g. [A-Fa-f0-9]{40,}) are intentionally excluded.
// They match git SHAs, Docker digests, checksums in go.sum/package-lock.json, etc.
// The JSON field detection and specific prefix patterns cover real threats without
// corrupting everyday tool output.
// jsonSecretFields matches JSON keys that typically hold secrets.
// Captures the key and value so we can redact the value in-place.
var jsonSecretFields = regexp.MustCompile(
`(?i)("(?:api_key|apikey|secret|token|password|access_token|auth_token|bot_token|app_token|channel_secret|channel_access_token|corp_secret|client_secret|verification_token|nickserv_password|sasl_password)")\s*:\s*"([^"]{8,})"`,
)
// RedactSecrets replaces known secret patterns in s with a redacted placeholder.
// It operates on both well-known token formats and JSON secret field values.
func RedactSecrets(s string) string {
if s == "" {
return s
}
// Pass 1: redact JSON secret field values (preserves key for context).
// e.g. "api_key": "sk-abc123..." → "api_key": "[REDACTED]"
result := jsonSecretFields.ReplaceAllString(s, `$1: "[REDACTED]"`)
// Pass 2: redact well-known token patterns anywhere in the text.
for _, pat := range secretPatterns {
result = pat.ReplaceAllStringFunc(result, redactToken)
}
return result
}
// redactToken replaces a matched token with a hint showing the prefix.
func redactToken(token string) string {
if len(token) <= 8 {
return "[REDACTED]"
}
// Show first 4 chars for identification, redact the rest.
return token[:4] + "...[REDACTED]"
}
// SanitizeResult applies secret redaction to both ForLLM and ForUser fields
// of a ToolResult. Returns the same pointer for convenience.
func SanitizeResult(r *ToolResult) *ToolResult {
if r == nil {
return r
}
r.ForLLM = RedactSecrets(r.ForLLM)
if r.ForUser != "" {
r.ForUser = RedactSecrets(r.ForUser)
}
// Also scrub error messages — provider errors sometimes include keys.
if r.Err != nil {
cleaned := RedactSecrets(r.Err.Error())
if cleaned != r.Err.Error() {
r.Err = &redactedError{msg: cleaned, cause: r.Err}
}
}
return r
}
// redactedError wraps a redacted error message while preserving the error chain.
type redactedError struct {
msg string
cause error
}
func (e *redactedError) Error() string { return e.msg }
func (e *redactedError) Unwrap() error { return e.cause }
// ContainsSecret checks whether a string contains any known secret pattern.
// Useful for pre-flight validation before logging or outputting content.
func ContainsSecret(s string) bool {
if jsonSecretFields.MatchString(s) {
return true
}
for _, pat := range secretPatterns {
if pat.MatchString(s) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// envSecretKeys lists environment variable name suffixes whose values should
// never appear in tool output.
var envSecretKeys = []string{
"_API_KEY", "_SECRET", "_TOKEN", "_PASSWORD", "_CREDENTIAL",
"_ACCESS_KEY", "_PRIVATE_KEY",
}
// IsSecretEnvVar returns true if the environment variable name looks like it
// holds a secret value. Matches on suffixes to avoid false positives on names
// like AUTHOR, AUTHORITY, or OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI.
func IsSecretEnvVar(name string) bool {
upper := strings.ToUpper(name)
for _, suffix := range envSecretKeys {
if strings.HasSuffix(upper, suffix) || strings.Contains(upper, suffix+"_") {
return true
}
}
return false
}